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BALANCING PUBLIC MARKET BENEFITS AND
BURDENS FOR SMALLER COMPANIES POST
SARBANES-OXLEY
PAUL RoSE*
Accumulating evidence suggests that several recent regulations
enacted by Congress and the SEC, including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,'
have disproportionately burdened smaller public companies in a
negative manner, such that many of these companies are exiting the
public markets. This Article describes these regulations, reviews
their effects, and proposes several options that the SEC might choose
to address the imbalance of costs and benefits for small businesses.
The simplest option would provide for a waiver or postponement of
certain regulations imposed under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. More sig-
nificant possible measures include the expansion of the SEC's small
business regulatory regime under Regulation S-B,2 and the creation
of a securities market for small-business issuers.
INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission has generally recog-
nized the need to tailor its regulations not only to satisfy investor ex-
pectations but also to reduce costs on securities issuers. Ideally, the
costs of the SEC's regulatory regime are balanced by its benefits to
investors and issuers. However, a series of recent regulations has cre-
ated an imbalance between these costs and benefits, particularly for
small businesses. A few scholars have argued that the Public Com-
pany Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 20023 (more
commonly known as the "Sarbanes-Oxley Act") imposes a dispropor-
* Associate, Covington & Burling, San Francisco, CA; B.A., Brigham Young Univer-
sity; J.D., University of California, Los Angeles. The views expressed are the author's own
and do not necessarily reflect the views of Covington & Burling.
1. Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §
7201 (2002) (hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
2. 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.10-.702 (2004) (pertaining specifically to small businesses).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 7201.
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tionately heavy burden on small businesses.4 However, two other
fairly recent SEC regulations-the application of the Exchange Act to
over-the-counter bulletin-board companies (OTCBB) in 19995 and the
adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Regulation FD) in 2006-
have also significantly affected the costs of access to the capital mar-
kets for many small companies. 7 As a result, some companies have
abandoned the public markets by "going private," while others have
"gone dark" by opting for lower-tier, less regulated markets such as
the "Pink Sheets ' 8 (a quotation service for small or troubled compa-
nies).
The OTCBB eligibility rule, Regulation FD, and Sarbanes-Oxley
were designed to respond to abuses of investor confidence, whether
by fraudsters' exploitation of the lightly regulated "bulletin boards,"
by preferential treatment of large investors and analysts, or by the
fraudulent accounting and gatekeeper failures that characterized the
4. See, e.g., Ellen Engel et al., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Firms' Going-Private Deci-
sions, available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/ papers.cfin?abstractid=546626 (Oct. 29,
2004).
5. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, National Associations of Securities Dealers,
Inc., Relating to Microcap Initiatives-Amendments to NASD Rules 6530 and 6540, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-40878, 64 Fed. Reg. 1255 (Jan. 4, 1999) (order granting approval of pro-
posed rule change).
6. Regulation F-D, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2004); see also Selective Disclosure and Insider
Trading, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7881, 34-43154, IC-24599, 17 CFR §§ 240, 243, 249
(Aug. 15, 2000).
7. For the SEC, a small business is a public company with less than $25 million in reve-
nues and $25 million in market capitalization. The Small Business Administration (SBA) gen-
erally defines a small business as a company with less than 500 employees. Size definitions
vary by industry and may be found at the SBA's Office of Size Standards website,
www.sba.gov/size (last visited Feb. 1, 2005). In this Article, I do not use a single-size thresh-
old to describe smaller companies, although I will note that the SEC's definition of a small
company in terms of market capitalization is less than a tenth the size of what brokers would
call the smallest of small-cap companies. See Investopedia.com, Market Capitalization De-
fined, at http://www.investopedia.com/articles/basics/03/031703.asp (last visited April 26,
2005).
8. See Pink Sheets LLC, About the Pink Sheets: Revolutionizing the OTC Markets, at
http://www.pinksheets.com/about/index.jsp (last visited Mar. 13, 2005).
The origins of the Pink Sheets go back to 1904, when the National Quotation Bureau began as
a paper-based, inter-dealer quotation service linking competing market makers in OTC securi-
ties across the country. Since that time, the Pink Sheets and the Yellow Sheets have been the
central resource for trading information in OTC stocks and bonds .... Today Pink Sheets
provides broker/dealers, issuers and investors with electronic and print products and informa-
tion services designed to improve the transparency of the OTC markets .... Pink Sheets is a
source of competitive market maker quotations, historical prices and corporate information
about OTC issues and issuers.
Id.
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Enron and WorldCom debacles. Because the OTCBB eligibility rule
imposed the burdens of Exchange Act disclosure on many smaller
firms, the privatization of certain firms as a result of the imposition of
the OTCBB eligibility rule was probably an expected (if not intended)
consequence, since the SEC anticipated that firms with something to
hide would prefer to go private rather than provide disclosure. Regu-
lation FD and Sarbanes-Oxley, on the other hand, likely were not ex-
pected to have a disproportionate effect on any issuers.
9
Accumulating evidence suggests that the regulations described
herein have disproportionately impacted smaller companies. As a re-
sult, the SEC has recently created a panel to examine the effects of
Sarbanes-Oxley on small businesses, 10 and the SEC is considering
how its regulations might be tailored for companies of different sizes.
I attempt here to consider several options that the SEC might choose
to address the imbalance of costs and benefits for small businesses.
Some of what I propose may properly be called "tailoring," while
some options would require significant restructuring of the SEC's
regulations and may require congressional action.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the costs
and benefits of being a public company under the SEC's regulatory
regime. Part II describes the OTCBB eligibility rule, Regulation FD,
and Sarbanes-Oxley and then discusses how they have added to the
regulatory burden on small businesses, such that the costs of being a
pubic company often outweigh the benefits. Part III offers several so-
lutions that would provide a better balance between the costs and
benefits of being a small public company. The simplest possibility
would provide for a waiver or postponement of certain regulations
imposed under Sarbanes-Oxley for small businesses." A more
sweeping (and likely more effective) measure would involve expand-
ing the scope of the SEC's existing relief, set out in Regulation S-B,
12
to a more significant number of businesses. Finally, the SEC and ex-
isting exchanges could consider creating a securities market for small
business issuers, comprised of a number of competitive exchanges.
The incentive for such a securities market is that it would create a
9. The intent of the SEC is less relevant with respect to Sarbanes-Oxley since Congress
dictated the content and scope of much of the SEC's Sarbanes-Oxley rulemaking.
10. See SEC Press Release 2004-174, SEC Establishes Advisory Committee to Examine
Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on Smaller Public Companies (Dec. 12, 2004).
11. As described below, the SEC has already done this with respect to some of the more
costly regulations. See infra Part III.
12. 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.10-702 (2004).
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more balanced regulatory structure, while still operating within the
self-regulatory organization (SRO) framework through which the
SEC oversees larger exchanges such as the NYSE and NASDAQ.
I. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF BEING A PUBLIC COMPANY
Public companies will differ in the costs incurred and benefits
obtained as a result of public status because of differences in size, in-
dustry and/or other factors. With that qualification, the following are
some general descriptions of the costs and benefits of public company
status that will serve as a baseline for our consideration of the addi-
tional effects brought on by the OTCBB eligibility rule, Regulation
FD, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
A. Benefits
Companies obtain benefits both from going public and from be-
ing public. As discussed below, some of the benefits obtained by go-
ing public become less significant or disappear within a short time af-
ter the Initial Public Offering (IPO).
1. Liquidity
A primary justification for going public is the creation of liquid-
ity-the ability of stockholders and the company issuing such stock to
buy or sell stock easily and without significantly affecting its price. 13
Because many state blue sky and federal securities law restrictions
will no longer apply to the sale of the company's securities, the com-
pany and its stockholders will be able to sell the securities to a
broader array of potential investors. After a short period of time fol-
lowing the offering (the "lock-up" period, which is generally set by
contract between the shareholder and the issuer14), executives and
13. For example, Google's registration statement indicated that creating investor and em-
ployee liquidity was a "significant factor" in its decision to go public. Registration Statement
of Google, Inc., filed on Form S-1 with the SEC (Apr. 29, 2004). Of course, the most signifi-
cant factor in Google's decision was almost surely the fact that they were going to have to file
periodic reports under the Exchange Act, despite private company status. Rule 12g-4 of the
Exchange Act requires periodic reporting by issuers with over 500 shareholders and
$10,000,000 in assets on the last day of each of the issuer's 3 most recent fiscal years. Google
stated that "[olur growth has reduced some of the advantages of private ownership. By law,
certain private companies must report as if they were public companies. The deadline imposed
by this requirement accelerated our decision." Id.
14. Standard lock-up agreements require shareholders to wait 180 days before disposing
of their shares, although some call for a lock-up of a year or more. See U.S. Securities and
[41:707
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other employees may begin to sell the stock they have accumulated
(subject to restrictions under the securities laws, including insider
trading rules). This liquidity benefit will continue throughout the
company's existence since directors, executives and employees likely
will continue to receive equity compensation.
A public market not only benefits employee-shareholders by
providing them an easier means of selling their shares, but it also
benefits the company by allowing it to incentivize employees, direc-
tors and executives by basing equity compensation on the actual mar-
ket value of the shares. A liquid public market for a company's
shares will also help the company recruit and retain employees and
managerial talent, since equity compensation is now regarded as a
standard component of executive compensation. On the other hand,
companies may find that they may not be able to offer the same up-
side potential that lured talented employees and executives to the
company pre-IPO. Indeed, companies may lose employees and ex-
ecutives who decide to cash out entirely as soon as possible following
the IPO.
Liquidity also rewards early investors, such as venture capital
firms, which place bets on promising companies in the hope that as
many as possible will go public or at least be acquired by other com-
panies for a profit. Along with employees, investors may have many
years and several rounds of financing invested in a company, and a
public offering allows these investors to cash in on their investment.
Note that with a company's executives and other employees, the li-
quidity benefit that a public market provides these investors may be
delayed by contractual agreements restricting the sale of the shares
during a lock-up period.
The extent of the liquidity benefit will vary across the market
from company to company. While every public company stock en-
joys some liquidity, the amount of trading of a company's stock, in
terms of trading frequency and number of shares, will depend in large
part on the company's market capitalization (the total value of the
company's issued and outstanding stock). Thus, a shareholder of Mi-
crosoft will have no trouble finding someone to buy his stock, and be-
cause of the high liquidity of the stock, the spread between the bid
and the ask (the price at which an investor is willing to purchase or
sell, respectively) will be tighter, resulting in more efficient share
Exchange Commission, Initial Public Offerings, Lock-up Agreements, at http://www.sec.gov/
answers/lockup.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2005).
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pricing. 15 If a stock is thinly or sporadically traded, or, in the case of
a smaller company, there are simply fewer shares available on the
market, a shareholder may have difficulty finding a buyer. Thus, the
shareholder will generally find a wider bid-ask spread, resulting in
less-efficient pricing.' 
6
2. Cash
An IPO can raise from a few million to more than a billion dol-
lars. 17 In 2004, the average amount raised through an IPO was ap-
proximately $190 million,' 8 with seven IPOs bringing in over a bil-
lion dollars each. 19 The cash from an IPO may be used for any
number of corporate priorities, which are generally described in the
"Use of Proceeds" section of the issuer's stock prospectus. Such pri-
orities often include acquisitions, expansion of research and develop-
ment, or operating capital.
3. Access to Markets
Once public, the company has the ability to raise additional
funds through follow-on stock offerings. A follow-on offering gener-
ally is completed on a much shorter timetable than an IPO, in part be-
cause through the IPO process, a company must develop relationships
with underwriters and accountants who have become well-acquainted
with the business. 20  Furthermore, after 12 months, and if the com-
pany meets certain requirements, the company may offer shares using
an abbreviated registration form (Form S-3).21 Much of the informa-
15. See, e.g., Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread,
17 J. FIN. ECON. 223, 246-47 (1986).
16. Id. at 240-45.
17. Because of the tremendous costs involved in becoming public and being public, one
is more likely to see an IPO of a billion dollars than an IPO of only a few million dollars worth
of stock. See The Red Herring, IPO Watch: 2004 in Review: A big year, by the numbers:
Google myths debunked, when and why the market recovered, the top IPOs, and the final
scorecard, at http://www.redherring.com/Article.aspx?a=l 1119&hed=IPO%2OWatch:%2020
04%20in%20review (Jan. 6, 2005) (last visited Mar. 13, 2005).
18. See id.
19. Id. The seven companies that raised at least $1 billion were: Genworth Financial
($2.83 billion); Assurant ($1.76 billion); Semiconductor Mfg International ($1.71 billion);
Google ($1.67 billion); Freescale Semiconductor ($1.58 billion); China Netcom Group ($1.03
billion); and Dex Media ($1.01 billion). Id.
20. See GAIL CLAYTON HUSICK & J. MICHAEL ARRINGTON, THE INITIAL PUBLIC
OFFERING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR EXECUTIVES 2 (Bowne & Co. 1998).
21. 17 C.F.R. § 239.13 (2004).
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tion in the S-3 may be incorporated by reference to documents filed as
exhibits to the Form S-1, 22 which is filed in connection with the IPO.
4. Raising the Profile of the Company
A company that goes public will raise its profile and enhance its
credibility. The company will generally receive some publicity from
the IPO and will often receive continuing analyst attention, 23 al-
though, as discussed below, smaller companies generally receive less
coverage. Furthermore, lenders and suppliers may believe public
companies to be better credit risks, and thus may be inclined to offer
better contract terms to those companies. Because public companies
are often deemed to be more stable, potential customers may be more
willing to contract with or purchase goods and services from public
companies than private companies. The enhanced credibility and
publicity achieved through becoming a public company is often more
important than the cash obtained through the IPO.
24
5. Creating Currency for Acquisitions
Public company stock is often used as merger consideration.
Companies will choose to offer stock in lieu of cash since stock-for-
stock acquisitions are generally eligible for more favorable tax treat-
ment than cash-for-stock transactions. 5
6. Disclosure Benefits
While mandatory disclosure undoubtedly imposes significant
costs on public companies (as discussed in Part I.B.2 below), it also
brings certain benefits. Investors benefit from the mandatory disclo-
sure's role as a commitment device.2 6 Without mandatory disclosure
requirements, companies would have incentives to withhold or ma-
nipulate information, especially when the information reveals poor
performance. Mandatory disclosure requires companies to reveal the
22. Id. § 239.11 (2004).
23. Indeed, the more analysts that cover the company, the better for the company. See
Daniel Bradley et al., The Quiet Period Goes Out With a Bang, 58 J. FIN. 1, 33-34 (2003).
24. See Elizabeth Demers & Katharina Lewellen, The Marketing Role of IPOs: Evidence
from Internet Stock, 68 J. FN. ECON. 413, 435 (2003).
25. See 26 U.S.C. § 368 (1999) (Internal Revenue Code provision defining different
classes of reorganization by stock or otherwise).
26. See Edward B. Rock, Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible Commitment
Theory of Mandatory Disclosure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 675 (2002).
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bad with the good, and is reinforced by penalties for companies pro-
viding incomplete, false or misleading information. The SEC's dis-
closure requirements and enforcement mechanisms act as an assur-
ance to investors and encourage investment in the stock market, a
systemic benefit to public companies and investors.
B. Costs/Burdens
Although companies obtain benefits both from going public and
from being public, companies also incur costs through both the IPO
process and the continuing obligations and expenses associated with
maintaining public company status.
1. Preparing for an IPO
An IPO is a costly, time-consuming process, with the majority of
direct fees attributable to costs such as printing expenses, investment
banking fees, attorneys' fees and the like. Many expenses also result
from a company's preparations for the IPO rather than the actual of-
fering process. For example, a public company may need to hire ad-
ditional personnel and may need to enhance its accounting and other
information systems in order to comply with the regulatory burdens of
public company status.
2. Regulatory Compliance Costs
Post-IPO, a public company will incur significant costs in com-
plying with the securities laws. The company will have periodic re-
porting requirements, including the obligation to file quarterly 10-Q
reports 27 and annual 10-K reports. 28 The company must also an-
nounce through Form 8-K29 filings certain significant interim events,
such as significant acquisitions, the loss of key employees, or even
the termination of the company's relationship with a major customer.
All of these filings will require significant employee effort (primarily
the firm's inside counsel and accountants) and may require extensive
and costly outside advice. 30
Public company insiders and large stockholders will become
27. 17 C.F.R. § 249.308a (2004).
28. Id. § 249.310(2004).
29. Id. § 249.308 (2004).
30. See, e.g., Thomas E. Hartman, The Cost of Being Public in the Era of Sarbanes-
Oxley, Foley & Lardner LLP 2004, at http://www.foley.com/files/tbl-s3 IPublications/File
Upload 137/2017/Public%2OStudy/20Results%20FINAL.doc.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2005).
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subject to Section 16 reporting requirements under the Exchange
Act 3' (which include requirements to report stock trades by company
insiders), and company personnel will spend significant time in moni-
toring compliance with Section 16. More generally, a company will
incur costs in creating and managing an insider trading prevention
program.32
3. Management Focus
An offering process requires significant management attention.
The IPO process may take six months to two years, and the participa-
tion of the chief executive officer (CEO), chief financial officer
(CFO) and chief legal officer (CLO) is mandatory throughout the
process. Meanwhile, management must also continue to oversee the
core business in order for the company to have something of value to
sell by the time of the IPO. Even after the IPO, however, the respon-
sibilities of public company status will often distract management fo-
cus from the business. Consider, for example, the mandatory annual
shareholders' meeting. Management often begins preparing the story
or vision it wishes to present at the meeting months in advance. Man-
agement will generally meet in planning sessions and drafting ses-
sions, craft speeches, prepare and review financial presentations, and
prepare for the customary question-and-answer session with activists
and disgruntled shareholders. These activities, while a necessary
function for public companies (and perhaps beneficial as an annual
diligence exercise), require significant management attention that
could be spent in developing the business.
4. Difficulty in Finding and Retaining Qualified Directors and
Officers
Officers and directors of public companies generally demand and
receive higher compensation than those of private companies because
of the perceived higher risks of managing a public company as com-
pared to a private one. Even with the allure of top compensation,
however, many companies have had difficulty in finding and retaining
managerial talent, and even more have reported difficulties in finding
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78(p) (2004).
32. These costs, usually incurred in the form of software purchase and support, can range
from a few thousand dollars to over $100,000. See, e.g., Executive Press, Section 16 Filer
Price Comparison Chart, at http://www.sectionl6.net/Filer/price-list.htm (last visited Mar. 13,
2005).
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qualified directors. 33 Companies seeking to go public must often re-
place certain management and directors with candidates possessing
public company expertise. Smaller companies seeking to go public
may find it difficult to pay the higher risk premiums (in the form of
higher cash and equity compensation) demanded by well-qualified of-
ficers and directors. In addition, even where a small company offers
compensation equal to that of a larger company, the officer or director
offered such an amount from a small company may seek the prestige
associated with working for a large, well-known company.
5. Loss of Flexibility in Managing the Affairs of the Company
A private company may conduct business informally, yet at the
same time, restrict the amount of information flowing within and
from the company. A public company, on the other hand, must con-
duct its business formally (especially with respect to matters of corpo-
rate governance) and must provide a steady stream of operational in-
formation to the public, including its employees, shareholders, and
competitors. While the SEC does not require a public company to
disclose all sensitive, competitive information, the company will nev-
ertheless be required to disclose (and receive shareholder approval
for) many strategic decisions, such as certain significant acquisitions
or equity compensation plans.34
II. REGULATIONS ADVERSELY AFFECTING SMALL BUSINESSES
As I detail below, Sarbanes-Oxley tipped the cost/benefit bal-
ance for many companies, pushing many smaller companies to exit
the public markets. However, prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, the cumula-
tive effect of other recent regulations, such as the OTCBB eligibility
rule and Regulation FD, had already made public life more difficult
for many small companies.
33. Under new SEC, NYSE and National Association of Security Dealers (NASD) rules,
at least one director must be a "financial expert," which, as a practical matter, means finding a
director who is or was an accounting professional or a senior corporate officer, such as a CFO
or CEO. See discussion infra Part II.C.6. A recent study of directors serving on publicly-
traded companies found that nearly one in three respondents cited difficulty in finding direc-
tors for one or more boards on which they serve. See Board Members Respond to Lasting Im-
pact on Corporate Reforms: Exclusive Results from Survey by Houlihan Lokey and Corporate
Board Member, at http://www.boardmember.com/network/HoulihanCBMresearch.pdf (last
visited April 25, 2005).
34. 17 C.F.R. §249.308 (2004).
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A. The OTCBB Eligibility Rule
The Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board is an electronic quotation
system for small companies not traded or listed on any of the national
exchanges, such as the NYSE or the American Stock Exchange
(AMEX). The OTCBB provides real-time quotes, last-sale prices, and
volume information, and it operates under the aegis of the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD).35 The OTCBB currently
lists over 3,000 public companies, with an average daily share volume
of over $250,000,000.36
Prior to the enactment of the OTCBB eligibility rule in January
1999, issuers on the OTCBB did not have to file periodic reports un-
der the Exchange Act if they (1) had never registered securities under
the 1933 Act and (2) were below the thresholds specified in Section
12(g) of the 1934 Act.37 Section 12(g) states that issuers with total
assets exceeding $10 million and a class of security held by more than
500 owners of record on the last day of the fiscal year must register
their securities under the Exchange Act.38 Note that the ownership
limit refers to "owners of record" and not the number of actual share-
holders. The number of actual shareholders is typically much higher
because many of the shares are often held in "street name" by a bro-
ker or clearinghouse (such as Cede & Co.), which, despite the number
of shareholders for whom the shares are held, is counted as a single
owner.
OTCBB companies are small and typically receive little public-
ity, and perhaps because of this, OTCBB companies have historically
received relatively less attention from the SEC. In the late 1990s,
however, the SEC noted a surge in OTCBB securities fraud. The
SEC then determined that it should bring small OTCBB companies,
including those falling below the size and shareholder limits set out in
the Exchange Act, under the same reporting standards applicable to
larger public companies. The enactment of the eligibility rule there-
fore required that all OTCBB companies comply with the periodic re-
35. The OTC Bulletin Board was created in June 1990, in part as a result of the Penny
Stock Reform Act of 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-429, 102, 104 Stat. 931, 933-34 (1990). The
Penny Stock Reform Act was designed to increase price transparency in the over-the-counter
market through the creation of an electronic quotation system. Id.
36. See OTCBB, Market Statistics, at http://www.otcbb.com (last visited Mar. 13, 2005).
37. 15 U.S.C. §78-12(g) (1988).
38. Id.
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porting requirements of the Exchange Act.39 Essentially, this means
that OTCBB companies must file quarterly reports on Form 10-Q,
annual reports on Form 10-K, and current event reports on Form 8-K
upon the occurrence of extraordinary corporate events. 40 Thus, these
firms went from a requirement of very little disclosure to a require-
ment of the kind of full disclosure applicable to the largest public
companies.
As was likely an anticipated consequence of the rulemaking (but
probably not an intended consequence) a large percentage of firms de-
termined that the costs of SEC compliance outweighed the benefits of
continued listing on the OTCBB. Nearly 75 percent of OTCBB firms
not previously filing with the SEC decided to move to the less regu-
lated "Pink Sheets" market, where firms remain exempt from the Ex-
change Act requirements so long as they stay below the ownership
and asset value thresholds.41 While these firms were thus able to
avoid the Exchange Act's disclosure burdens, a recent study from the
Wharton School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania dem-
onstrates that these companies also suffered permanent decreases in
liquidity and related decreases in market value.42 In effect, the
OTCBB eligibility rule shut down a kind of incubation chamber for
many smaller companies, and arguably did not effectively respond to
the problem of OTC fraud since many small companies moved to the
less-regulated Pink Sheets markets.
B. Regulation FD
The SEC designed Regulation FD to end the practice of compa-
nies providing material information to certain analysts and institu-
tional investors before disclosing the information to the rest of the
public.43 Regulation FD requires that when an issuer intentionally
discloses material information, it must do so publicly and not selec-
tively.44 An issuer must make the required disclosures by filing the
information with the SEC or by another method (such as a web cast or
39. Pub. L. No. 101-429, 102, 104 Stat. 931, 933-34 (1990).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Brian J. Bushee & Christian Leuz, Economic Consequences of SEC Disclosure
Regulation: Evidence from the OTC Bulletin Board, 39 J. OF ACCT. & ECON. (forthcoming
2005).
43. Release Nos. 33-7881, 34-43154, IC-24599, File No. S7-31-99.
44. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2000).
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press release) intended to reach the public on a broad, non-
exclusionary basis.
45
The preservation of investor confidence was a primary reason for
the SEC's adoption of Regulation FD.46 Implicitly, if small investors
feel that institutional investors are receiving valuable information be-
fore it is publicly available and are thereby profiting at small inves-
tors' expense, small investors may be unwilling to invest in the mar-
kets. Despite its well-intentioned goal of providing equal access to
material public company information, Regulation FD drew heavy
criticism. Believing that companies might provide less disclosure be-
cause of fear of liability under Regulation FD, opponents argued that
Regulation FD would have a chilling effect on company/investor
communications and that "information transfer between companies
and investors would deteriorate.47
A 2004 study by scholars at Wharton validates these concerns.48
The study results suggest that Regulation FD raised costs for smaller
firms by forcing a "significant reallocation of information-producing
resources." 49 Many companies could no longer rely on disclosures to
analysts as a means of getting important information to the public.
The researchers found that "small firms on average lost 17% of their
analyst following and big firms increased theirs by 7%, on average. 5 °
Analyst coverage is a significant benefit of public company status be-
cause it brings information about companies to current and potential
investors. The study concluded that, as an overall economic effect,
the decrease in analyst coverage of small companies has cost those
businesses approximately 138 basis points annually.5' Put in other
terms, the difference in analyst coverage accounts for an approxi-
mately 1.38 percent difference in the returns on a portfolio of small
company stocks versus a portfolio of large company stocks.
The study also found that while large companies are almost
twice as likely to make voluntary earnings announcements, small
45. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7881
(Aug. 15, 2000).
46. Id.
47. Armando R. Gomes et al., SEC Regulation Fair Disclosure, Information, and the
Cost of Capital (July 8, 2004), AFA 2005 Philadelphia Meetings; EFA 2004 Maastricht Meet-
ings Paper No. 4339, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=529162 (last visited Feb. 1, 2005).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 4.
51. Id.
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companies did not increase their pre-announcements significantly.52
Thus, although there is equal access to information, generally there is
less information to be had from smaller companies.
C. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
The third recent rulemaking that has affected small companies,
and perhaps the most significant securities rulemaking since the Ex-
change Act of 1934, is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.53 Sarbanes-Oxley
has generated many criticisms from businesses and their lawyers, and
of these many complaints, the most frequently and consistently heard
is that Sarbanes-Oxley is unduly costly and burdensome given its
benefits to shareholders and the general public. As discussed below,
many observers also worry that Sarbanes-Oxley restricts risk-taking.
Before reviewing the effect of Sarbanes-Oxley, however, a brief de-
scription of the scope of its regulations is worthwhile.
Others have described the regulations in greater detail than is
needed for our purposes here; 54 1 will only sketch the contours of Sar-
banes-Oxley, and where appropriate, discuss the underlying rationale
for the regulations. I will then turn to Sarbanes-Oxley's effects, par-
ticularly as they relate to smaller companies. Many of the effects
were anticipated and intended by the SEC, while others were unin-
tended consequences. Unintended effects are only now becoming ap-
parent as SEC regulations are beginning to be implemented, so the
debate over the real value of the legislation is becoming focused on
actual results rather than theoretical suspicions that commentators ex-
pressed prior to the enactment of the regulations.
Sarbanes-Oxley regulates various dimensions of corporate re-
sponsibility and accountability. Many of its provisions focus on the
actions of certain "gatekeepers," such as a company's outside ac-
countants and lawyers, while others relate to actions by the corpora-
tion itself.
1. Gatekeeper Regulation
An individual investor may have many reasons for investing in a
52. Id. at 12.
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266 (2002).
54. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. LAW 1 (2002); Lawrence A. Cun-
ningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And it Might Just Work),
36 CONN. L. REv. 915 (2003).
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particular company. Perhaps the investor wants to diversify by in-
vesting in a particular sector of the market, views a certain company's
stock as undervalued, likes the company's products, or perhaps values
the company's policies relating to the environment. Whatever moti-
vation or combination of motivations compels investment, the most
common desire among all shareholders is the accretion of share value.
To this end, management, as agents of the shareholders, constantly,
sometimes aggressively and occasionally recklessly, pursues value-
creating opportunities. Gatekeepers such as audit committees, inde-
pendent auditors, analysts and outside counsel provide a check on
management activity, constraining activities that do not serve the ba-
sic goal of return on investment or that otherwise serve the interests of
management at the expense of shareholders.
So why did gatekeepers fail to prevent frauds such as those or-
chestrated by the management of Enron, Adelphia, and others?55 The
failure is attributable in part to numerous conflicts of interest between
management, shareholders, and the gatekeepers who often tried to
serve both. Audit committees were often staffed (and sometimes
chaired) by insider directors. 56 "Independent" directors were some-
times not truly independent.57 Truly independent directors serving on
audit committees often did not have the motivation or the institutional
58
support necessary to actively monitor management activities.
Meanwhile, lawyers, auditors and analysts were often compromised
by their firms' dependency on the fees generated by the services they
55. For a general discussion on the role of gatekeepers in the fall of Enron, see John C.
Coffee Jr., Understanding Enron: It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid, Columbia Law & Eco-
nomics Working Paper No. 207, at http://ssrn.com/abstract=325240 (July 30, 2002).
56. This was the case at Adelphia, for example, where insider Timothy Rigas served on
the audit committee. See Adelphia's annual report on Form 10-K, at http://sec.freeegar.
com/EFXdll/EDGARpro.dll?FetchFilingHTMLISessionlD=Y8GNI6pWOThJUmc&ID=33
59737 (last visited Feb. 1, 2005).
57. For example, a number of Enron's directors were found to have not been
independent. See "The Role of the Board of Directors in Enron 's Collapse, " Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the United
States Senate, available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/senpsi70802rpt.pdf (July
8, 2002). Generally, a director may not be considered "independent" if he or she (or an
immediate family member) has or recently had a material relationship with the company. For
a discussion of the specific independence rules for the NYSE and NASDAQ, see NASD and
NYSE Rulemaking: Relating to Corporate Governance, Commission Rel. No. 34-48745
(November 4, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-48745.htm (lat visited April
25, 2005).
58. Id.
WILLAMETTE LA WREVIEW
performed for and on behalf of the company.59 The possibility of ero-
sion of the gatekeeper firms' reputation is no longer a sure deterrent
to a firm partner's casual audit or disingenuous opinion letter; the in-
terests of the firm and its employees, partners or members are not al-
ways aligned, especially where a particular company is one of only
two or three big clients of a given firm employee.
Sarbanes-Oxley attempts to address the problem of gatekeeper
failure by limiting or eliminating conflicts of interest and by increas-
ing penalties for ignoring or facilitating illegal activities. The gate-
keeper regulations include:
a. Directors and Audit Committees of the Board of Directors.
Audit committees must be composed of independent directors
only.60 The audit committee has discretion over the hiring and over-
sight of the firm's outside auditors, and it must be provided sufficient
funding to compensate such outside auditors. 61 Audit committees
also must have at least one member qualified as a "financial expert, 62
which essentially means that the member must possess the ability to
understand the minutiae of financial reporting.
b. Accountants.
A central component of Sarbanes-Oxley was the creation of the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), 63 which re-
placed the accounting industry's self-regulatory scheme. The
PCAOB operates independently of the industry and falls under the
supervision of the SEC.64 Among other responsibilities, the PCAOB
registers, monitors, investigates, and disciplines the activities of pub-
lic accounting firms. 65
59. See Coffee, supra note 55.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(3)(A) (2002). See also Disclosure Required by Sections 406
and 407 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Exchange Act Release No. 34,47235 (Jan. 23, 2003).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(6) (2002).
62. Management and Certain Security Holders, 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(h)(1)(i)(A) (2004).
See also Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Exchange Act
Release, No. 34,47276 (Jan. 29, 2003).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 7217(a).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(c).
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c. Attorneys.
The SEC's rulemaking enlists attorneys (both in-house and out-
side counsel) in policing issuers. 66 The new SEC rules require attor-
neys to report evidence of a material violation of securities laws or a
breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by a company "up-the-
ladder" within the company, e.g., to the issuer's chief legal officer or
to both its chief legal officer and its chief executive officer.67 If the
company's management does not respond appropriately68 to the evi-
dence, the attorney must report the evidence to the audit committee,
another committee of independent directors, or the full board of direc-
tors.
69
66. Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the
Commission in the Presentation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R § 205.1 (2004); see also Stephen M.
Bainbridge & Christina J. Johnson, Managerialism, Legal Ethics, and Sarbanes-Oxley § 307,
MICH. ST. L. REv. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=434721 (last visited
Feb. 1, 2005).
67. Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the
Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (2004).
68. "Appropriate response" is defined as follows:
[A] response to an attorney regarding reported evidence of a material violation as a result of
which the attorney reasonably believes:
(1) That no material violation, as defined in paragraph (i) of this section, has occurred, is ongo-
ing, or is about to occur;
(2) That the issuer has, as necessary, adopted appropriate remedial measures, including appro-
priate steps or sanctions to stop any material violations that are ongoing, to prevent any mate-
rial violation that has yet to occur, and to remedy or otherwise appropriately address any mate-
rial violation that has already occurred and to minimize the likelihood of its recurrence; or
(3) That the issuer, with the consent of the issuer's board of directors, a committee thereof to
whom a report could be made pursuant to §205.3(b)(3), or a qualified legal compliance com-
mittee, has retained or directed an attorney to review the reported evidence of a material viola-
tion and either:
(i) Has substantially implemented any remedial recommendations made by such attorney after
a reasonable investigation and evaluation of the reported evidence; or
(ii) Has been advised that such attorney may, consistent with his or her professional obliga-
tions, assert a colorable defense on behalf of the issuer (or the issuer's officer, director, em-
ployee, or agent, as the case may be) in any investigation or judicial or administrative proceed-
ing relating to the reported evidence of a material violation.
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the Com-
mission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(b); see also Implementation of
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Exchange Act Release No. 34,47276 (Jan.
29, 2003).
69. Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the
Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 205.3 (2004).
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d Analysts.
New SEC Regulation Analyst Certification (Regulation AC) re-
quires an analyst to certify in his or her research reports that the views
expressed in the research report accurately reflect such research ana-
lyst's personal views about the subject securities and issuers.7' The
analyst must also disclose whether part of his or her compensation
was, is, or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recom-
mendations or views contained in the research report.7 1 If such a con-
nection exists, the statement must include the source, amount, and
purpose of such compensation, and further disclose that such compen-
sation may influence the recommendation in the research report.72
2. Corporate Governance
Numerous commentators pointed out long before Enron the one-
sidedness of the management-director relationship at many compa-
nies 73-in certain egregious cases, directorships appeared to be little
more than rubber-stamp positions enjoyed by close associates of
management. 74 Sarbanes-Oxley, therefore, imposed numerous restric-
tions on governance practices which have historically been the prov-
ince of states,75 and, to some degree, the stock exchanges.
Some of these governance restrictions are packaged as disclosure
rules.76 For instance, a company must disclose the name of its audit
committee financial expert, and if the company does not have an audit
committee financial expert, it must explain why it does not.77 Since
almost all companies have disclosed or will disclose that they have an
audit committee financial expert,78 meeting this governance standard
70. Regulation AC-Analyst Certification, 17 C.F.R. § 242.501(a)(5) (2004); see also 15
U.S.C. § 78d-3-78j-1 (2002).
71. 17 C.F.R. § 242.501(a)(2)(ii)(A).
72. 17 C.F.R. § 242.501(a)(2)(ii)(B)-(C).
73. See, e.g., MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 10 (Princeton University Press 1994).
74. See, e.g., Robert Frank & Elena Chemey, Lord Black's Board: A-List Cast Played
Acquiescent Role, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2004, at Al (giving a recent example of this sort of
governance failure).
75. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, 26
REGULATION 1, 26-31 (2003) (critiquing federal encroachment on corporate governance mat-
ters).
76. 17 C.F.R. 229.401.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Deloitte & Touche, Audit Committee Financial Expert Designation and
Disclosure Practices Survey, available at http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/article/0,2297,sid%
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will likely not positively affect the company's stock price. On the
other hand, the failure to meet this standard is likely to negatively af-
fect a company's stock price, since the failure to recruit an audit
committee financial expert may signal that management has some-
thing to hide. Such a disclosure requirement is functionally a stealth
governance regulation, although, in form, the SEC stays within its
traditional bounds of disclosure regulation. A similar stealth govern-
ance regulation is found in the requirement that a firm disclose its
code of ethics for financial officers. 79 If a company does not have a
code of ethics in place, it must disclose why it does not; 80 the threat of
punishment by the market if a code of ethics is not in place will pre-
sumably compel every company to create such a code.
Sarbanes-Oxley provides for other direct governance regulations.
Section 13(k) of the Exchange Act (enacted by Section 402 of Sar-
banes-Oxley) makes it unlawful for a public company to loan funds or
extend credit to directors or executive officers. 8' Under Section 304
of Sarbanes-Oxley, if a public company is required to restate earnings
as a result of noncompliance with any of the securities laws because
of misconduct, the CEO and CFO must reimburse the company for
(1) any bonus or equity-based compensation received or (2) any prof-
its from a sale of company securities, during the 12 months following
the filing of the restated financial statements.8 2  Sarbanes-Oxley also
prohibits trades by insiders during pension plan "black-out" periods.83
3. Disclosure Regulation
Sarbanes-Oxley requires disclosure of off-balance sheet transac-
tions84 and requires issuers to disclose on a "rapid and current basis"
253D5601%2526cid%253D29064,00.html (Nov. 2003).
79. Item 406 of Regulation S-K.
80. Id.
81. § 78m(k).
82. § 7243(a)(1)-(2).
83. More specifically, Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits directors and executive officers of a
public company from selling or transferring company stock (if it was acquired through their
service with the company) during a "black-out period." General Rules and Regulations, Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (2004). A black-out period is defined as a period
of more than three consecutive business days in which at least 50% of the participants in the
company's participant-directed defined contribution plans cannot sell or otherwise transfer
their company stock held under the plans. Regulation Blackout Trading Restriction, 17 C.F.R.
§ 245 (2004). See also Insider Trades During Pension Fund Blackout Periods, Exchange Act
Release No. 34,47225 (Jan. 22, 2003).
84. § 7261(c)(1)(A); see also Exchange Act Release No. 34-47264 (Jan. 27, 2003). The
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material changes in their financial condition or operations. 85 This lat-
ter requirement is largely accomplished through the expanded Form
8-K disclosure requirements. 86 Almost all companies must also dis-
close their contractual obligations in a tabular form, including all
leases, debt and many purchase obligations.87
4. Enhanced Enforcement
Finally, Sarbanes-Oxley enhances the SEC's enforcement pow-
ers. As noted above, the SEC may require forfeiture of certain equity
profits and compensation in the event of a restatement of the com-
pany's financial results.88 Professionals appearing before the SEC are
subject to SEC discipline in the event of "improper conduct.189
Criminal sanctions await CEOs and CFOs who violate the certifica-
definition of "off-balance sheet arrangement" includes any contractual arrangement to which
an unconsolidated entity is a party, under which the registrant has any obligation under certain
guarantee contracts; a retained or contingent interest in assets transferred to an unconsolidated
entity or similar arrangement that serves as credit, liquidity or market risk support to that entity
for such assets; any obligation under certain derivative instruments; or any obligation under a
material variable interest held by the registrant in an unconsolidated entity that provides fi-
nancing, liquidity, market risk or credit risk support to the registrant, or engages in leasing,
hedging or research and development services with the registrant. Id.
85. 15 U.S.C. § 7261(c)(1)(A).
86. Among the new requirements on Form 8-K, issuers must disclose the following: the
entry into a material agreement not made in the ordinary course of business; termination of a
material agreement not made in the ordinary course of business; termination or reduction of a
business relationship with a customer that constitutes a specified amount of the company's
revenues; creation of a direct or contingent financial obligation that is material to the company;
events triggering a direct or contingent financial obligation that is material to the company,
including any default or acceleration of an obligation; exit activities including material write-
offs and restructuring charges; any material impairment; a change in a rating agency decision,
issuance of a credit watch or change in a company outlook; movement of the company's secu-
rities from one exchange or quotation system to another, delisting of the company's securities
from an exchange or quotation system, or a notice that a company does not comply with a list-
ing standard; conclusion or notice that security holders no longer should rely on the company's
previously issued financial statements or a related audit report; and any material limitation,
restriction or prohibition, including the beginning and end of lock-out periods, regarding the
company's employee benefit, retirement and stock ownership plans. See generally 17 C.F.R.
§§ 228, 229, 240, 249; Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of
Filing Date, Exchange Act Release No. 34-46084 (June 17, 2002).
87. Disclosure In Management's Discussion and Analysis About Off-Balance Sheet Ar-
rangements and Aggregate Contractual Obligations, Securities Act Release No. 33-8182 (Jan.
28, 2003). The contractual obligations table is intended to enhance the ability of investors to
evaluate cash-flow requirements arising out of the issuer's outstanding contracts, including
debt, leases, and purchase obligations.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 7243.
89. 15 U.S.C. § 78d-3(a)(2).
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tion requirements with respect to financial reporting. 90 As a response
to the actions of Enron and Arthur Anderson, Sarbanes-Oxley also
imposes criminal penalties of up to 20 years imprisonment and fines
of up to $10 million for anyone who "knowingly alters, destroys, mu-
tilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any re-
cord, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct,
or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter
within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United
States." 91
5. Direct Costs Imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley
As expected, most of the regulations described above resulted in
additional costs to public companies. Some regulations, however,
have proven to be much more costly, in both time and money, than
the SEC originally anticipated.92 The following discussion provides
examples of such costs.
a. Additional Burdens on Directors
One of the primary results of Sarbanes-Oxley is an increase in
the supervisory responsibilities of directors, and especially independ-
ent directors. The standard rationale justifying this increase, which a
number of scholars question,93 is that independent directors are more
reliable stewards than management or "interested" directors. 94 Fol-
lowing from this rationale is the decision to tighten the rules on direc-
tor independence, which was primarily accomplished through revised
NYSE95 and NASDAQ 96 listing standards. The new listing standards
for both markets provide a requirement that a majority of directors be
independent, enhance independence standards for directors (height-
90. 15 U.S.C. § 1350 (c).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 802.
92. The SEC originally believed that the internal controls requirement would take only
five additional hours of company time. See Disclosure Required by Sections 404, 406 and 407
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Exchange Act Release No. 34-46701 (Oct. 22, 2002).
93. See, Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE's Director Independence Listing
Standards, UCLA School of Law, Research Paper No. 02-15 (June 2002), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-317121 (last visited Mar. 10, 2005); see also April Klein, Firm Per-
formance and Board Committee Structure, 41 J. L. & ECON. 275 (1998).
94. Id.
95. NYSE Listed Company Manual, § 303A.00, available at http://www.nyse.com/
Frameset.html?displayPage=/listed/1022221393251 .html (last modified Nov. 3, 2004).
96. NASDAQ standards are codified in NASD Rules 4200 and 4350, available at
http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/index.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
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ened even further for independent directors serving on audit commit-
tees, one of which must be a "financial expert" 97), and expand duties
for directors serving on audit, nominating, or compensation commit-
tees.
98
As a result of these added responsibilities and independence re-
quirements, some companies have had difficulty in finding willing,
qualified directors (which, as noted above, was already somewhat dif-
ficult). Increased responsibilities bring increased workload for direc-
tors. Audit committee directors, particularly, should be, and have
been, meeting more often. 99 Director compensation (generally han-
dled on a per-meeting basis) and reimbursement of travel expenses is
likely to disproportionately affect smaller companies. Directors' and
officers' insurance costs have risen 100-400 percent, depending on
the size of the company.100 Also, as noted in a recent study by schol-
ars at the University of Georgia,' 0 ' director cash compensation has
risen substantially, especially for small firms. While directors' com-
pensation has risen only slightly for large companies post-Sarbanes-
Oxley, from 13 cents per $1,000 in sales in 1998 to 15 cents per
$1,000 in sales in 2004, small firms' costs have gone up signifi-
cantly-small firms paid $5.91 to non-employee directors per $1,000
in sales in 1998, versus $9.76 per $1,000 in sales in 2004.102 Overall,
the authors find that the evidence they reviewed is "consistent with
the notion that SOX has imposed disproportionate burdens on small
97. The SEC rules does not require companies to have an audit committee financial ex-
pert, but companies that do not have one must disclose that and explain why they do not. See
17 C.F.R. § 229.401(h) (2004).
98. NYSE Listed Company Manual, § 303A.00, available at http://www.nyse.com/
Frameset.html?displayPage=/listed/102222139325 1.html (last modified Nov. 3, 2004); NASD
Rules 4200 and 4350, available at http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/index.html (last
visited Mar. 10, 2005).
99. See Deloitte & Touche Audit Committee and Governance Survey Results, available at
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/ACgovernSurveysc.pdf (Apr. 2003).
100. Jo Lynne Koehn & Stephen C. Del Vecchio, Ripple Effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, 74 CPA J. 36, available at http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajoumal /2004/204/essentials/
p36.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2005). Note that director and officer (D&O) costs are not
wholly attributable to increasing liability (which roughly correlates with increasing responsi-
bility) under Sarbanes-Oxley; D&O costs began to rise as a result of Enron. See, e.g., Christo-
pher Oster, Insurers Expected to Try to Deny WorldCom Officers' Coverage, WALL ST. J.,
July 1, 2002, at C14.
101. James S. Linck, Jeffry M. Netter & Tina Yang, Effects and Unintended Conse-
quences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Corporate Boards, available at http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=687496 (last visited April 25, 2005).
102. Id. at 4.
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firs.
' 10 3
b. Additional Disclosure Requirements
Sarbanes-Oxley mandated new disclosure requirements, and
mandatory certifications by the CEO and CFO with respect to the
company's periodic reports build in an additional enforcement
mechanism with respect to those disclosure requirements. Companies
must now also disclose material off-balance sheet transactions and the
use of non-GAAP financial measures. 10 4  Most controversial, how-
ever, is the requirement of an annual management report on, and audit
of, the company's internal control over financial reporting. 105 The
SEC added a related requirement that companies maintain disclosure
controls and procedures, which essentially requires that management
analyze whether the company's internal controls are "designed to en-
sure that information required to be disclosed by the issuer in the re-
ports that it files or submits under Sarbanes-Oxley is recorded, proc-
essed, summarized and reported within the time period specified in
the Commission's rules and forms."'' 0 6 Creating a reliable, robust in-
ternal control environment often requires significant outside advice
from accountants, attorneys and other consultants, and the advice
naturally comes at significant cost. The internal and disclosure con-
trols requirements are probably the most costly (and thus, the most
controversial) aspect of Sarbanes-Oxley.
Financial Executives International conducted a survey of public
companies in July 2004 to assess implementation costs. 107 The end
result is that all companies are going to have to pay significant
amounts to comply with the internal controls requirement. 0 8 How-
ever, if we analyze the survey data by company size, it becomes clear
that small companies pay a proportionately higher price. For compa-
103. Id.
104. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(0) (adopted pursuant to Section 401(a) of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). Non-GAAP financial measures include "financial information that
is calculated and presented on the basis of methodologies other than in accordance with gener-
ally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)." Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial
Measures, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47226 (Jan. 22, 2003).
105. 17 C.F.R. § 229.308 (2004) (adopted pursuant to Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act).
106. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 13a-15.
107. FEI Survey on Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Implementation, available at
http://www.fei.org/files/spacer.cfm?file-id=780 (last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
108. Id.
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nies with less than $100,000,000 in revenues, vendor costs (for things
like software and related consulting services) will cost an average of
$192,000, roughly 400 percent the cost to the largest public compa-
nies as a proportion of their revenues. 10 9 These smaller companies es-
timate they will require an average of 837 hours of external support
from accountants and lawyers, proportionately about 385 percent of
the time required by the largest public companies.'l 0 The smaller
companies estimate compliance will require over 2,000 hours from
internal staff, proportionately about 150 percent of the time required
by the largest public companies."' Finally, the auditor's report that
companies must file with their periodic report will cost smaller com-
panies an average of $259,500, nearly 650 percent of the cost to the
largest public companies as a proportion of revenues.
12
More importantly, however, the internal controls requirements
have caused some small company managers to shift labor expendi-
tures from revenue-developing employees, such as engineers, to
monitors, such as lawyers and accountants.' 13 Even if the labor costs
for the accountants and lawyers equate to the cost for engineers, the
opportunity costs will likely be significant, though difficult to quan-
tify.
6. Unintended Costs of Sarbanes-Oxley
While the effects described above were largely intended or at
least anticipated, a number of unintended effects have surfaced.
Some effects are relatively minor; others have considerable ramifica-
tions. The following discusses a number of unintended effects of
Sarbanes-Oxley.
a. Increased Record-Keeping Burdens
Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, a charge of obstruction of justice by de-
struction of evidence required the government to show that an indi-
vidual destroyed the evidence with knowledge that the evidence was
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. For example, the CEO of Agile Software had to lay off 11 engineers so that the
company could afford to hire 11 accountants and lawyers. "This is requiring a level of bu-
reaucracy and control that far exceeds any amount of reasonableness and return of cost." Deb-
orah Lohse, Crackdown on Books Strains Valley Firms, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 27,
2004 (quoting Bryan Stolle).
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sought in an official proceeding." 14  Sarbanes-Oxley shifts the bur-
den.1 5 Section 802(a) states the following:
[W]hoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers
up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or
tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the
investigation or proper administration of any matter within the ju-
risdiction of any department or agency of the United States or any
case filed under title 11, or in relation to or contemplation of any
such matter or case, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not
more than 20 years, or both.116
Sarbanes-Oxley thus covers not only current investigations of a
company, but possible investigations. Most (if not all) public compa-
nies have created document retention policies in order to avoid de-
stroying important documents. Storage requirements must often be
met through additional information technology spending (for software
and servers) and warehousing of paper files with document manage-
ment companies.
b. Effects on Audit Services
Commentators suspect that Sarbanes-Oxley will adversely affect
audit services in several ways.1 17 Some accounting firms have used
audit services as a loss-leader," 8 selling non-audit services at a pre-
mium to make up for below-cost auditing services. Sarbanes-Oxley
imposed restrictions on accounting firms' ability to provide both non-
audit and audit services to the same client, eliminating an apparent
conflict of interest. 19 However, Sarbanes-Oxley's restrictions on
auditors will likely have negative consequences. Some accounting
firms may decide to focus on more lucrative consulting work and
drop audit services altogether, reducing competition in the market-
place. Reduced competition may provide upward pressure on audit
114. Gary G. Grindler & Jason A. Jones, Please Step Away from the Shredder and the
"Delete" Key: §§802 and 1102 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 67, 67-69
(2004).
115. 15 U.S.C. §§ 802, 1102.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 802.
117. Koehn & Del Vecchio, supra note 100.
118. However, Lynn Turner, former chief accountant of the SEC, contends that it is a
myth that accounting firms use audit services as a loss-leader; industry commentators and ex-
ecutives dispute his views. See Richard H. Gifford & Harry Howe, Regulation and Unin-
tended Consequences: Thoughts on Sarbanes-Oxley, available at www.nysscpa.org/
printversions/cpaj/2004/ 604/p6.htm. (last visited Feb. 1, 2005).
119. Pub. L. No. 107-204, §301(2), 116 Stat. 745, 776.
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pricing. More significantly, however, the enhanced requirements of
Sarbanes-Oxley (such as the requirement of an auditor's report on the
effectiveness of the company's internal controls 120 ) will certainly re-
quire more work from the auditors, and thus more fees paid to the
auditors.
c. Foreign Delistings
As noted by Professor Larry Ribstein,12 1 foreign companies are
balking at Sarbanes-Oxley's additional requirements, even though
foreign companies are exempt from many of Sarbanes-Oxley's provi-
sions. 22 As Ribstein explains, a poor fit between Sarbanes-Oxley's
provisions and a foreign jurisdiction's governance requirements will
necessitate extensive compliance efforts (assuming that a company is
able to reconcile the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley with its home
jurisdiction), which may outweigh the benefits of listing in the United
States.123 Anecdotal evidence suggests that many foreign companies
have decided against U.S. exchange listing as a result of Sarbanes-
Oxley.
124
d Risk Aversion
Perhaps the most pernicious unintended consequence of Sar-
banes-Oxley is the chilling effect it has had on management's will-
ingness to take business risks. William Donaldson, Chairman of the
SEC admitted that he "worr[ies] about the loss of risk-taking zeal.
People are confusing business risk-taking with legal risk-taking,
which is a mistake."'125 While some worry that Sarbanes-Oxley
threatens to create "chronic economic paralysis, 126 others, most no-
tably Representative Michael Oxley, believe that the risk-aversion
120. Id.
121. See Larry E. Ribstein, Cross-Listing and Regulatory Competition, available at
http://home.law.uiuc.edu/-ribstein/ribsteinclea.pdf (Oct. 6, 2004).
122. See Kenji Taneda, Sarbanes-Oxley, Foreign Issuers and United States Securities
Regulation, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 715 (2003) (discussing the exemptions at length).
123. Ribstein, supra note 121, at 34.
124. Id. at 27.
125. Adrian Michaels, After A Year of US Corporate Clean-Up, William Donaldson
Calls for a Return to Risk-Taking, FinancialTimes.com. (July 24, 2003), available at
http://securities.stanford.edu/news-archive/2003/20030724_Headline06_Michaels.htm (last
visited Mar. 10, 2005).
126. Rich Karlgaard, "Digital Rules," Forbes.com., available at http://www.forbes.
com/technology/free forbes/2003/0929/037.html (Sept. 29, 2003).
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created by Sarbanes-Oxley will diminish. 127  Risk aversion among
managers is difficult to quantify. Given the SEC's expectation of ex-
panded board oversight, however, Sarbanes-Oxley may indeed sys-
tematically penalize risk-taking, since directors tend to manage more
cautiously than executives.
D. Small-Business Responses Post-Sarbanes-Oxley
Alan Beller, director of the SEC's Division of Corporation Fi-
nance, argues that we have not yet realized and accounted for all of
the benefits from Sarbanes-Oxley. 128 Indeed, Sarbanes-Oxley has re-
ceived some praise; a recent survey found that 74 percent of financial
executives surveyed agreed that Sarbanes-Oxley has provided some
benefits to companies and shareholders129 through greater account-
ability of management and an emphasis on accurate financial report-
ing.130 These benefits should contribute to higher stock prices, which
is the one benefit that investors and companies, as a whole, really
want to receive. A company and its investors presumably are con-
cerned with the promotion of trust in the markets insofar as that trust
can be translated into higher stock prices. Even if such benefits are
being realized, the continuing disparity between the costs and benefits
has driven many smaller companies to go private, or, in other cases,
to go dark.
1. Going Private
The general proposition that Sarbanes-Oxley is causing firms,
and especially small firms, to go private has already received some
attention. However, some of the evidence provided in support of the
proposition has been suspect.13 1  One widely cited study of public
companies by the law firm Foley & Lardner stated that 21 percent of
127. "Risk aversion is a natural consequence of the shock the system went through.
Don't expect it to be long term." Ari Weinberg, No Party Hats For Sarbanes-Oxley,
FORBES.COM, available at http://www.forbes.com/2003/07/30/cx aw_ 0730sarbanes.html
(July 30, 2003).
128. Alan Beller, Remarks at the 58th National Conference of the American Society of
Corporate Secretaries, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch071004alb.htm (July
10, 2004).
129. Steve Burkholder, Survey Cites Benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, CORP. COUNS.
WKLY., Jan 26, 2005, at 28.
130. Id.
131. See Beller, supra note 128.
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the study's respondents were considering going private. 32 However,
the study relied on a very small sample size: 9,000 surveys were sent
out, but only 115 public companies (1.3 percent) responded. 133 Fur-
thermore, one should suspect that firms most negatively impacted by
Sarbanes-Oxley would tend to respond at a relatively higher rate to a
survey about the costs of Sarbanes-Oxley; therefore, the survey may
not represent the general market impact of Sarbanes-Oxley.
A more recent study by scholars at the University of Chicago
provides a more reliable indication of the effects of Sarbanes-
Oxley. 134 In that study, the authors investigated the going-private de-
cisions of firms from 1998 to 2004, and concluded that while the fre-
quency of going private decisions of all companies has only increased
modestly since the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, going-private deci-
sions of smaller firms increased significantly after the passage of Sar-
banes-Oxley. 135 The authors attribute the increase not only to the
greater burdens of Sarbanes-Oxley, but also to the relatively smaller
net benefits of being a public company for smaller firms.
13 6
2. Going Dark
Another study by scholars from Wharton indicates that many
small companies have decided to "go dark," rather than go private, in
response to Sarbanes-Oxley. 137  In 2003 alone, approximately 200
companies went dark.138 "Going dark" means that a company delists
its shares from the exchange on which it is traded. Perhaps a more
apt term is "going pink," since the company typically continues to
trade in the Pink Sheets, a web-based quotation service which is con-
sidered the lowest rung of public company exchange status. The Pink
Sheets is largely composed of penny stocks, and Pink Sheets compa-
nies are not required to provide the kind of detailed financial disclo-
sures that registered companies must provide under the Exchange
132. Thomas E. Hartman, The Cost of Being Public in the Era of Sarbanes-Oxley 12, at
12, available at http://www.foley.com/files/tbl-s3lPublications/FileUploadl37/2017/Public
%20Study%20Results%20FINAL.doc.pdf (May 19, 2004).
133. Id. at 11.
134. See Ellen Engel et al., supra note 4.
135. Id. at 24.
136. Id. at 25.
137. Christian Leuz et al., Why do Firms go Dark? Causes and Economic Consequences
of Voluntary SEC Deregistrations, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=592421 (Nov. 2004).
138. Id. at 39.
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Act, 39 unless, of course a company reaches the thresholds under §
12(g) discussed above.1 40
Companies that go private or go dark typically suffer a perma-
nent decrease in the value of the company's stock, largely because of
a decrease in liquidity. For example, a 2004 study found that share-
holders of NASDAQ companies delisted between the years 1999-
2002 experienced an average wealth-loss of 19 percent. 141 Investors
will also pay less for the stock of a company that is no longer required
to provide detailed disclosure since they will have less confidence in
the quality of their investment. As a result of the decrease in share
value, a company will not receive as much value for its stock in future
offerings. Also, the company's stock as merger consideration will be
less valuable. The increased costs will thus affect the company's abil-
ity to hire, to innovate, and to grow.
E. Protecting Smaller Businesses
If we acknowledge that the regulations described above do have
an adverse effect on small companies, why not take the position that
if small companies cannot meet the rigorous standards of public com-
pany status, then they should go private or remain private? Lynn
Turner, former chief accountant for the SEC, seems to have taken that
position, stating that the SEC's transparency and accounting standards
are "part of the price of being a public company. If you don't want to
pay the price, go private.' 42 The statement reflects an SEC focus on
the largest issuers, who, through economies of scale, are better able to
absorb the costs of compliance (as played out in the Financial Execu-
tives International numbers described above). 143 While I believe that
for efficiency reasons the SEC should indeed be focused on the larg-
est issuers (as discussed below), the SEC should not unduly burden a
particular segment of the market that it regulates.
With respect to small companies, particularly, there are several
reasons why insuring that they have fair access to capital markets is
139. For a brief discussion of these rules, see the Pink Sheets discussion on quoting Pink
Sheets securities, available at http://www.pinksheets.com/otcguide/brokers-index.jsp (last
visited Mar. 10, 2005).
140. See discussion supra Part II.A.
141. James J. Angel et al., From Pink Slips to Pink Sheets: Liquidity and Shareholder
Wealth Consequences of NASDAQ Delistings 25, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract id=628203 (Nov. 2, 2004).
142. Koehn & Del Vecchio, supra note 101, at 36.
143. See FEI Survey on Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Implementation, supra note 107.
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important. First, small companies are relatively better innovators.
Over the past decade, among patenting companies as a whole, small
businesses produced 13 to 14 times more patents per employee than
large patenting companies. 44  As a measure of the importance of
these patents, small company patents are twice as likely as large firm
patents to be among the one percent most cited as prior art in subse-
quent patent applications. 1
45
Small businesses are also job-creators. While small businesses
employ approximately 50 percent of the private workforce, they have
accounted for 60-80 percent of the net new jobs annually over the last
ten years. 146 Providing easy access to capital will help ensure that
companies have the resources to innovate and grow.
Admittedly, other corporate arrangements, such as partnerships
or collaborations (such as are used with many biotech companies)
could provide some funding for companies, that under the current
regulatory regime, cannot become or remain public. Many of the
benefits described in Part I, however, would not be available in these
arrangements. Furthermore, the availability of many different ar-
rangements benefits businesses by allowing companies to match their
goals and business models to appropriate contractual/regulatory
schemes. The availability of other corporate forms and arrangements
(and, in some cases, the availability of other regulators offering the
same product) also generally encourages regulators to streamline and
adapt their regulations to meet their constituents' needs.147 The SEC
understands the importance of small businesses-for example, the
Commission has an office of small business policy which has served
as a kind of ombudsman's office for small business owners. More
importantly, however, the Commission has recently shown that it is
taking seriously the concerns about how its regulations are effecting
small businesses by creating an Advisory Committee on Smaller Pub-
lic Companies. 148 This new committee held its first meeting on Tues-
day, April 12th.
149
144. See Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, Small Business by the
Numbers, available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/stats/sbfaq.pdf (last modified June 2004).
145. Id. at 1. The term "prior art" refers to the body of previously patented inventions.
146. Id.
147. See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 225-83 (1985).
148. 69 Fed. Reg. 244 (Dec. 21, 2004).
149. Notice of First Meeting of SEC Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-51417 (Mar. 23, 2005).
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III. SUGGESTIONS ON REBALANCING BENEFITS AND BURDENS.
Part II discussed how the balance of costs and benefits have
shifted such that many smaller companies are deciding to either go
private or go dark. Part III discusses possible solutions to this imbal-
ance.
A. Increasing Benefits
As discussed earlier, the benefits of being public are generally
available to all issuers, although there is often a qualitative difference
in these benefits depending on the size of the company. Smaller
companies' shares are often less liquid since trading in the companies
may be sporadic and thin, which means that smaller companies and
their investors benefit less than larger companies and their investors
because larger companies typically have more liquid shares. Unsur-
prisingly, small companies also have significantly less analyst cover-
age,150 again, in part as a result of Regulation FD. The diminished
benefits for smaller companies plausibly explains why, when viewing
cross-sections of the stock market by market capitalization, price-to-
earnings ratios tend to decrease as market capitalization decreases. 15'
In other words, small companies' shares tend to sell for comparatively
less even if their earnings relative to market capitalization are similar
to larger companies.
Practically speaking, it is doubtful that the SEC can or even
should impose further regulations in an effort to level the playing
field for smaller companies. Would we want the SEC to require ana-
lyst coverage for smaller companies? How could the SEC (or stock
exchanges, for that matter) provide the large-cap benefits of market
liquidity for smaller companies? As a general matter, how could the
SEC accomplish such goals without increased cost?
As a regulator, the SEC has the ability to control the imposition
of burdens more easily than the endowment of benefits. The SEC
imposes the burdens of disclosure on a company, for instance, but it
generally does not affect liquidity benefits-the market itself deter-
mines whether a stock will be sold, how often, and at what price. En-
hancing the benefits of small public companies thus seems an unlikely
150. See, e.g., Nicholas Galluccio, Analysis & Valuation of Small-Cap Stocks, Presenta-
tion at the AIMR 2002 Equity Research and Valuation Techniques Conference, available at
http://www2.cfapubs.org/cp/issues/v2002n3/toc.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2005).
151. Id.
WILLAMETTE LA W REVIEW
method of balancing the costs and benefits.
B. Reducing the Burdens Imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley
While certain requirements under Sarbanes-Oxley are probably
non-negotiable since they are specifically set out in the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act' 52 (the CEO and CFO certifications required under Sec-
tions 302 and 906, for example), other requirements could be better
tailored for small businesses. Alternatively, the SEC could suspend
application of certain provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley for small compa-
nies. The SEC has granted some relief to smaller companies already:
* Public companies with less than $75 million in market
capitalization were exempted from the accelerated dead-
lines for quarterly and annual reports.153 (Under accel-
erated reporting rules, companies are required to pro-
duce periodic reports more quickly-from 90 to 60 days
for annual reports, and from 45 to 35 days for quarterly
reports). 154
* Public companies with less than $25 million in revenues
and $25 million in market capitalization were not re-
quired to provide a table of contractual obligations. 155
* Small business issuers were given an extra six months to
comply with the rule requiring disclosure of whether
they have an audit committee financial expert.156
* Public companies with less than $75 million in market
capitalization were given an additional nine months to
comply with the new rules requiring a report on internal
control over financial reporting.157
Further relief could be granted, however, for the more costly re-
152. Sarbanes-Oxley is a congressional act, so the SEC has limited ability to make altera-
tions to it. For a general discussion of the SEC's exemptive authority, see James D. Cox,
Premises for Reforming the Regulation of Securities Offerings, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
I I(Summer 2000).
153. See Acceleration Of Periodic Report Filing Dates And Disclosure Concerning Web-
site Access To Reports; Correction, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8128 (Sept. 5, 2002).
154. Id.
155. Disclosure In Management's Discussion And Analysis About Off-Balance Sheet
Arrangements And Aggregate Contractual Obligations, supra note 87.
156. Standards Relating To Listed Company Audit Committees, Securities Act Release
No. 33-8220 (Apr. 9, 2003).
157. Management's Report On Internal Control Over Financial Reporting And Certifica-
tion Of Disclosure In Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Securities Act Release No. 33-8238
(June 5, 2003).
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quirements. For example, although the SEC has already extended the
effective date for compliance with the internal controls requirements
(until 2007 for some companies) 158 in order to give many companies
time to put in place the necessary personnel and control structures ne-
cessitated by the requirement, the SEC should consider ways to alle-
viate the annual burden of compliance. Concerned with smaller com-
panies' ability to absorb the annual costs of an internal control review,
the Small Business Administration's advocacy group has proposed
that smaller companies should only be required to perform the inter-
nal controls review once in order to certify that the internal controls
system is effective. 159  After that, the company need only disclose
changes in the internal controls system. 160  Presumably, such a rule
should also require disclosure of any changes in the company's busi-
ness or business environment that are reasonably likely to affect the
efficacy of the internal controls system.
With respect to the design of an internal controls system, the
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) designed an internal
control framework that serves as a model framework for public com-
panies.' 6' However, the system was created primarily for larger com-
panies, and, therefore, is not ideally suited for use by smaller compa-
nies. Because of this, the SEC has suggested that an internal controls
framework could be designed with smaller businesses in mind,16 and
COSO is beginning work on new guidance directed toward smaller
companies. 163
158. Id.
159. See Letter of the Small Business Administration's Office of Advocacy, to the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission, available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/comments
/sec02_0819.html (Aug. 19, 2002).
160. Id.
161. Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO),
Internal Control-Integrated Framework, available at http:/lwww.coso.org/publications
/executive summaryintegratedframework.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2005).
162. See Office of the Chief Accountant, SEC Division of Corporation Finance, Man-
agement's Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclo-
sure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports: Frequently Asked Questions, available at
http://www.sec.gov/info/accountants/controfaql004.htm (last modified Oct. 6, 2004); see also
Alan Beller, Director of the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance, Remarks at the 58th Na-
tional Conference of the American Society of Corporate Secretaries, available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch071004alb.htm (July 10, 2004).
163. COSO to Develop Guidance on Controls Framework, CORP. COUNS. WKLY., Jan.
19, 2005, at 19.
WILLAMETTE LA WREVIEW
C. Expansion of Regulation S-B
Another solution to the heavy burdens on small businesses im-
posed by current SEC regulations might be the expansion of Regula-
tion S-B. 164 Regulation S-B offers disclosure relief to small compa-
nies through a more tailored small business reporting scheme (Form
10-KSB 165 and Form 10-QSB) 166 . The SEC developed Regulation S-
B over a decade ago as part of its small business initiatives.' 67
The small business initiatives involved the adoption of a number
of new regulations, including rule changes that simplified the process
of registering small business issues for public sale,' 68 increased the
dollar threshold for certain exemptions from registration of securities
offerings,' 69 and simplified the ongoing reporting requirements for
smaller companies through Regulation S-B.170
The small business initiatives were designed in part to respond to
changes in the nature of banking that made it more difficult for small
businesses to raise capital through bank loans.' 7' The nature of bank-
ing changed primarily because the nature of investment changed; in-
vestors looked to equity or debt investing, including through the as-
cending mutual fund industry, as opposed to simply earning interest
by depositing money in a bank in savings accounts or purchasing cer-
tificates of deposit.17 2 In turn, banks looked to other, more profitable
activities, such as underwriting, securities and derivatives trading, and
cash management. 173
164. 17 C.F.R. § 228.10 (1995).
165. 17 C.F.R. § 249.310b (1992) (providing that a small business issuer may use this
form for its transition and quarterly reports. The issuer "shall file within 45 days after the end
of the first three fiscal quarters of each fiscal year. No report need be filed for the fourth quar-
ter of any fiscal year. Transition reports shall be filed in accordance with the requirements set
forth in Rule 13a-10 or Rule 15d-10.").
166. 17 C.F.R. § 249.308b (1992) (providing that a small business issuer has 75 days
after the end of a fiscal year covered by the report for fiscal years ending on or after Dec. 15,
2003 and before Dec. 15, 2005 to provide annual and transition reports pursuant to section 13
or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934).
167. Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release No. 33-6949, (July 30, 1992).
168. See 17 C.F.R. § 239.9 (1993) (Form SB-I); 17 C.F.R. § 239.10 (1992) (Form SB-2).
169. This was accomplished through the revision of Regulation A. See Small Business
Initiatives, Securities Act Release No. 33-6949 (July 30, 1992).
170. Id.
171. William J. Coffey & Lewis Schier, Small Business Initiatives under the Securities
Acts, CPA J., T 3 (Jan. 1995), at http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajoumal/old/I6349293.htm.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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While the small business initiatives, and Regulation S-B in par-
ticular, have benefited many smaller companies by providing easier
access to capital, the regulations offer only limited relief for a couple
of reasons. Most significantly, the regulations apply to very few issu-
ers; since its adoption, Regulation S-B has been available only to pub-
lic companies with less than $25 million in revenues and less than $25
million in market capitalization. 174  As a result of this restriction,
Regulation S-B companies are often small, family-controlled compa-
nies or companies already trading on the Pink Sheets.
175
Regulation S-B's requirements have also been criticized as
merely being "S-K lite.', 176 Indeed, Regulation S-B's disclosure re-
quirements are almost identical to the rules under Regulation S-K
(which, in part, governs the disclosure for larger public companies),
although Regulation S-B's items generally require less detail.
177
Note, however, that Sarbanes-Oxley still applies, with limited excep-
tions, to Regulation S-B companies.
178
A simple solution could remedy the problem of the limited ap-
plicability of Regulation S-B. The SEC should simply raise the reve-
nue threshold above $25 million. Indeed, the SEC considered this so-
lution in 1999 when the staff proposed raising the revenue threshold
to $50 million. 179 Furthermore, the SEC also considered elimination
of the $25 million market capitalization requirement. According to its
calculations, these changes would have expanded the number of eligi-
ble businesses by a third. 1
80
Recall that the SEC chose the figure of $75 million in market
capitalization for relief from Section 404 (the internal controls re-
quirement) 181 and the accelerated reporting deadlines.' 82  If the SEC
174. Id. at 12.
175. See Marc Morgenstern & Peter Nealis, The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on Mid-Cap
Issuers, at n.5, available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus /mmorgensternmidcap.pdf (last
visited Feb. 1, 2005).
176. Id. (quoting Richard Leisner).
177. Coffey & Schier, supra note 171, at T 18.
178. See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
179. See Testimony of Brian Lane, Director, Division of Corporation Finance, before the
House Subcommittee on Government Programs and Oversight, Committee on Small Business,
re: Providing Information to Small Businesses Concerning the Process of "Going Public," n.6,
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testarchive/1999/tsty2499.htm (Oct. 14,
1999).
180. Id.
181. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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currently views $75 million in market capitalization as an important
threshold to divide larger and smaller public companies, they could
certainly justify moving the small company definition under Regula-
tion S-B up to this amount, which would provide the benefits of
Regulation S-B, even if they are slight, to many more companies.
Note that the SEC focused on market capitalization rather than
revenue when determining which companies should receive relief
from Section 404. I take this as an indication that the SEC appropri-
ately focuses on market capitalization when considering investor pro-
tection issues, since, put pessimistically, market capitalization indi-
cates how much there is to lose with a particular company. Since
Sarbanes-Oxley was designed to prevent massive losses by investors
in black-hole companies like Enron, it is little wonder that the SEC
focused on market capitalization when drafting its rules.
On the other hand, when considering how to help small busi-
nesses (as in 1999), the SEC should be less concerned with market
capitalization and more concerned with revenue, which in part indi-
cates the ability of small companies to shoulder the burdens of regula-
tion. Post-Sarbanes-Oxley, it seems unlikely that the SEC would ig-
nore market capitalization as a measure of the applicability of
Regulation S-B. What would be a likely result, and still very benefi-
cial to small businesses, is a Regulation S-B eligibility requirement
that covers companies with revenues of $75 million or less and a
market capitalization of $75 million or less. This would both provide
relief to small businesses and reaffirm the SEC's concern with inves-
tor protection. Of course, the SEC could provide relief to many more
companies by increasing the thresholds to $200 million or even $300
million, which would still only capture what the brokerage industry
considers to be small-cap companies. 183
The expansion of Regulation S-B would also benefit the SEC.
Consider that each year, the SEC receives more than 600,000 docu-
ments, including annual reports from more than 12,000 reporting
companies, totaling approximately 18,000,000 pages annually. 184 The
SEC's Division of Corporation Finance, comprised of approximately
350 staff members (many of whom do not review disclosure as part of
their jobs), is tasked with monitoring these disclosures. 185 Further-
183. See supra note 7.
184. See 2003 SEC ANN. REP. at 63, available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/annrep03
/ar03full.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2005).
185. Id. at 61.
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more, Sarbanes-Oxley requires that the SEC review each issuer at
least once every three years. 186  However, in 2003 the Division of
Corporation Finance was able to review only 23 percent of the annual
reports filed by the 12,830 reporting companies.1 87 The Division of
Corporation Finance must now review annually approximately one-
third of all annual reports.
Given that the disclosures required under Regulation S-B are less
detailed than those required under Regulation S-K, the SEC would
presumably have less disclosure to review and would appropriately
spend more time reviewing the more detailed larger company disclo-
sures than reviewing smaller company disclosures. Such an alloca-
tion of SEC resources according to issuer size would fall in line with
the SEC's determination to "review its procedures to comply with this
provision of the Sarbanes Oxley Act and to ensure Division resources
are directed toward those issuers, filers or industries that most warrant
review. ''
88
With respect to the content of Regulation S-B, and as a more
ambitious project, the SEC should also reconsider the proper level of
disclosure for Regulation S-B companies. Regulation S-B predates
the OTCBB eligibility rule, Regulation FD, and Sarbanes-Oxley.
This means that small companies eligible to use Regulation S-B are
operating under a heavier overall regulatory burden than imposed a
decade ago. In light of these additional regulations, some of the dis-
closure requirements of Regulation S-B could be revised or elimi-
nated.
D. Creation of a Small Companies Market
Another option to alleviate regulatory burdens would involve the
creation of a separate, small issuers market, administered by stock ex-
changes.189 I consider this to be a less likely option than the expan-
186. 15 U.S.C.§ 408.
187. 2003 SEC ANN. REP. at 63, available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/annrep03/
ar03full.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2005).
188. Id. at 62. To further this goal, the SEC has established an Office of Risk Assess-
ment to consider how the SEC might better focus its examination and disclosure review pro-
grams. See SEC 2004-2009 Strategic Plan at 25, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/ sec-
stratplan 0409.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2005).
189. Note that NASDAQ already has a small-cap market, but it has the same governance
requirements for both the small-cap market and the national market. NASDAQ did consider
introducing a small-company market, called the BBX, but gave up the idea in 2003. See Small
Cap Market Watch, BBX The Market Exchange That Never Was, available at
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sion of coverage of Regulation S-B, since it would require significant
expenditures and regulatory will to create the market. Creation of the
market would require at least two major steps. First, the SEC would
be required to eliminate (or allow exemptions for) registration and
Exchange Act requirements for companies under certain revenues and
market capitalization thresholds, such as revenues and market capi-
talization of $300 million. Second, the exchanges would be required
to develop an adequate regulatory framework (such as disclosure re-
quirements and listing standards) in place of the SEC's current regula-
tory regime.
1. Elimination of SEC Regulation
The SEC has been given broad rulemaking and exemptive power
under Section 28 of the 1933 Act and Section 36 of the 1934 Act.
Section 28 states that
The Commission, by rule or regulation, may conditionally or un-
conditionally exempt any person, security, or transaction, or any
class or classes of persons, securities, or transactions, from any
provision or provisions of this title or of any rule or regulation is-
sued under this title, to the extent that such exemption is necessary
or appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with the pro-
tection of investors.
This grant of authority (and the similar grant of authority in Sec-
tion 36 of the 1934 Act) would arguably encompass the exemption for
small companies and small company securities that would be required
to create a small companies market. Still, many technical issues
would arise from such a rulemaking; the SEC would likely develop
transition rules for companies moving up from the smaller companies
market to SEC regulation, for instance, and, alternatively, rules for
companies moving down to the smaller companies market.
Notwithstanding the problems posed by such technical issues
(which, I suspect, would be comparatively less significant than the
technical issues created by Sarbanes-Oxley), the SEC and the invest-
ing public would have much to gain from the creation of a small
companies market. As noted above, since Sarbanes-Oxley requires
the review of every issuer under its jurisdiction, the SEC will un-
doubtedly spend thousands of hours reviewing the disclosure of hun-
dreds of companies each year that have relatively small economic im-
pact on society. Given its limited resources, the SEC might spend
http://smallcapmarketwatch.comL/articles/66.asp?edition=most (June 28, 2003).
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significant time reviewing disclosures of smaller companies, so that
its staff may not have sufficient resources to detect and prevent prob-
lems at an Enron-sized company. On the other hand, if the SEC
spends too much time on larger companies and only offers cursory
review of smaller issuers' filings, it might miss the kind of wide-
spread fraud that led to the enactment of the OTCBB eligibility rule.
Because the SEC has limited resources, and because it must di-
rect resources to those issuers who most warrant review, the SEC
could satisfy these concerns by effectively outsourcing much of the
regulation of small issuers by allocating disclosure review functions
to small company exchanges. Because the exchanges would be fo-
cusing on smaller companies with smaller market capitalizations, the
SEC would serve investors better by focusing its resources on larger
companies with larger market capitalizations-those companies
whose shares are generally the most widely held and in which the to-
tal investment in dollar terms is more significant. From a risk-
management perspective, the creation of a small companies market
benefits the SEC. The crucial issue, however, is whether the creation
of a small company market is "necessary or appropriate in the public
interest, and is consistent with the protection of investors," as required
under Section 28 of the 1933 Act and Section 36 of the 1934 Act.
The following sections briefly discuss how regulation by one of more
small company exchanges could satisfy these requirements.
2. Regulation by Exchanges
Regulation by exchanges has received some attention in recent
years, 190 most notably by Professors Paul Mahoney' 91 and Adam
Pritchard. 92 Both Mahoney and Pritchard argue that exchanges may
provide more effective regulation than government regulators such as
the SEC, in large part because competitive pressures among ex-
changes will create incentives to provide listing and disclosure stan-
dards that are more appealing to investors and issuers. From an in-
vestor's standpoint, appealing listing and disclosure standards are
those which provide adequate protection of the investment.
190. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1997-1998); see also Marcel Kahan, Some Problems with
Stock Exchange-Based Securities Regulation, 83 VA. L. REV. 1509 (1997) (discussing some
concerns with this approach).
191. Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453 (1997).
192. Adam C. Pritchard, Self-Regulation and Securities Markets, REGULATION, Spring
2003, at 32.
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a. Multiple Exchanges
Ideally, a smaller companies market would be comprised of a
number of stock exchanges, which would allow for regulatory compe-
tition among the exchanges. The most efficient means of developing
such exchanges would be through the efforts of existing SROs, such
as the NYSE, NASDAQ and the AMEX. Indeed, except through the
expansion of existing SROs, small company exchanges would be
unlikely to form because the lack of the head-start provided by exist-
ing regulatory experience and structures would likely be unjustifiably
high.
Smaller companies exchanges could also develop from existing
alternatives such as the Pink Sheets and the OTCBB. While these ex-
changes would necessarily undergo significant changes in order to
create a governance regime acceptable to investors and governmental
monitors, they have a head start in understanding the concerns of
smaller companies and investors in those companies, which would
help them develop rules appropriate to a smaller companies market.
b. Disclosure and Governance Rules
What sort of disclosure and governance rules should smaller
companies exchanges develop? With respect to disclosure rules, the
lessons learned through the scandals that resulted in the enactment of
Sarbanes-Oxley would hopefully not be lost on the exchanges. Un-
doubtedly the exchanges would keep strong investor protections, not
only because investors would demand them, but also because the SEC
would likely keep the exchanges on a short leash. The SEC currently
has supervisory authority over SROs through Section 19 of the Ex-
change Act of 1934,193 and would, as a condition to the creation of a
smaller companies market, retain authority over exchanges in the
market. In practice (and similar to the process for existing SROs), the
exchanges would likely be required to obtain SEC approval for pro-
posed disclosure regulations, and would engage in extensive negotia-
tions with SEC staff in order to insure that the regulations provide
adequate investor protection.
While the content of the disclosure regulations would perhaps
193. The SEC's oversight of the exchanges has been called "raised eyebrow" regulation,
however, I believe that the expression underestimates the practical regulatory force of the SEC
with respect to SROs. See Donald E. Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45
OHIO ST. L.J. 545, 571 (1984).
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vary from exchange to exchange, the exchanges would undoubtedly
require less disclosure than is required under Regulation S-K, and
perhaps even significantly less than is required under Regulation S-B.
As noted above, regulatory competition among several markets would
allow for some experimentation, flexibility, and varied investor focus;
varied disclosure regulations would spur competition among the ex-
changes. One might imagine a market that provides a fairly sophisti-
cated set of disclosure rules, while another market may require rela-
tively fewer disclosures but impose more strict governance
requirements.
c. Enforcement
An exchange enforcement regime involves at least two compo-
nents. The first is a mechanism designed to respond to violations of
exchange rules, such as a violation of listing standards. The second
mechanism must respond to securities law violations. To the extent
that a small company's exchange was affiliated with a larger ex-
change, such as the NYSE or NASDAQ, the exchange could rely on
similar listing standards enforcement mechanisms as used for the lar-
ger exchanges. The smaller-companies exchange possibly would also
piggyback on the enforcement provided by regulatory structures that
are in place in the larger exchanges. Without relying on similar stan-
dards in the larger exchanges, the small-companies exchanges would
be required to create such structures. Furthermore, smaller companies
exchanges, like the larger exchanges, would rely on the SEC and the
Department of Justice for assistance with securities law violations.
d. Vertical Competition
In Part III.D.2.a I noted how regulatory competition among the
exchanges (horizontal competition) would help ensure that the ex-
changes develop more optimal market rules for issuers and investors.
Another means of ensuring that a small companies market as a whole
remains competitive would be to allow these smaller companies the
right to trade in the major markets-in essence, allow for vertical
competition between the NYSE, the AMEX, and NASDAQ and small
company exchanges-so long as they comply with current Exchange
Act requirements and the listing standards of the larger exchanges. I
suspect that a fair number of smaller companies would want to stay in
the major markets if they believed that doing so signaled stability and
high governance standards. Such vertical competition would test
WILLAMETTE LA W REVIEW
whether investors are willing to pay for the benefits of regulations
like Sarbanes-Oxley. Of course, many companies may not have the
economic luxury of staying in the larger market, despite the benefits.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this Article I have sketched out some possibilities that would
provide relief for smaller companies such that the benefits of being
public outweigh, or are at least balanced, with the costs of being pub-
lic. As studies now suggest, recent regulations have had a significant,
disproportionate, negative effect on small companies. The SEC, with
assistance from the newly-formed Advisory Committee on Smaller
Public Companies, is now beginning to consider ways to alleviate
these effects. The SEC may be tempted to simply perform a line-item
revision of Sarbanes-Oxley, but other alternatives would likely prove
more beneficial in the long term. The heavy regulatory burden on
small companies is not just a Sarbanes-Oxley problem, however.
Sarbanes-Oxley may be a proximate cause of many small companies'
going private or going dark, but the existing regulatory structure was
already making public life difficult for smaller companies.
Instead of trying to adapt Sarbanes-Oxley for smaller companies
(or instead of merely adapting Sarbanes-Oxley for smaller compa-
nies), the SEC could expand the coverage of Regulation S-B and
could take a fresh look at S-B's regulations post Sarbanes-Oxley,
Regulation FD and the OTCBB eligibility rule. Because of the rela-
tive simplicity of this solution, it is perhaps the most preferable; pro-
viding relief through the expansion of Regulation S-B would not in-
volve the creation of new rules, nor would it create significant
transaction costs.
Although less ideal, and less likely, because of the significant
costs required by its creation, a small-companies market would allow
for more experimentation with the securities regulatory scheme af-
fecting small businesses (such as the governance restrictions under
Sarbanes-Oxley). Competitive pressures would hopefully encourage
small-company exchanges to precisely tailor disclosure and other
regulations, an advantage over the one-size-fits-all regulation under
an expanded regulation S-B. Furthermore, allowing exchanges to
govern issuers themselves would alleviate the SEC's logistical and
risk-management concerns created by the triennial review require-
ment under Sarbanes-Oxley.
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